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Geopolitical Shifts in the Evolving New World 
Order*
György Szapáry – Dániel János Plósz
Recent geopolitical developments point to the emergence of a multipolar new 
world order. Globalisation brought about by the internationalisation of trade and 
the diffusion of technology has radically changed the impact of world powers. 
A hegemon today is much better able to extend its influence and enforce its interest 
worldwide. The purpose of this paper is to look at what are the key requirements 
for a country to reach world power status in the current globalised world and 
discuss which countries meet the conditions to have a credible chance of becoming 
a dominant player in the emerging new world order. The paper concludes that 
China is best positioned to challenge the economic dominance of the United States. 
The European Union does not punch its weight in influencing global policies, and 
the question is whether it will be able to or want to assume the responsibilities 
of a world power. For the Visegrad 4 countries and the other Central and Eastern 
European countries, as members of the European Union and NATO that are situated 
at the cross roads between East and West, it is of vital interest to reflect on what 
geopolitical shifts one can expect in the decades ahead.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: O10, O20, O30 
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1. Introduction
Recent geopolitical developments point to the emergence of a multipolar new 
world order. China’s rise as an economic world power and Russia’s new-found 
assertiveness are challenging the hithertofore generally undisputed unipolar 
world order dominated by the United States. Around the world and even in some 
quarters in the United States itself, many perceive that the American hegemony 
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is on a course of rapid decline. However, geopolitical changes have typically been 
slow, often taking several centuries before a dominant world power was replaced 
by another. Sometimes the change was relatively peaceful, sometimes it was the 
result of a brutal war. In ancient times, hegemons’ power and influence were at 
a regional level by current world standards. Athens and Rome basically ruled the 
Mediterranean basin, with extensions into Central and Northern Europe by the 
Romans. At its apogee, the Ottoman Empire spanned from Western Asia to parts 
of Europe and Africa. These were vast and populous territories with inhabitants 
belonging to different cultures speaking different languages. That region is rightly 
considered as the “cradle” of civilisation, although the contribution of ancient China 
to western civilisation must also be recognised.1 Still, these ancient empires ruled 
over only a small part of the globe.
In the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, Great Britain came close to being 
a dominant world power even by current standards, as it possessed colonies in 
Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and territories in Oceania, had a dominant presence 
on the seas and enjoyed a decisive role in international trade and finance, with 
the pound sterling as an international reserve currency. Its hegemony abruptly 
disintegrated after WWII with Great Britain losing its colonies and the United States 
taking over dominance over the seas, international trade and finance, innovation 
and technology, and the US dollar becoming the universally accepted world 
reserve currency. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United 
States has come to dominate the world in ways unmatched at any time in human 
history.
Globalisation brought about by the internationalisation of trade and the diffusion 
of technology has radically changed the impact of world powers. A hegemon today 
is much better able to extend its influence and enforce its interest worldwide. 
Hence, the contest for influence now plays out at the global level, but only a few 
have a shot at becoming a serious challenger. No respectable thinker would contend 
that America will cease to be a dominant world economic power in the foreseeable 
future, but it is a reality that its relative influence in the world order will decline as 
challengers emerge. America’s lead is increasingly contested, or at least not looked 
upon as “natural”.
Many authors have studied the rise and decline of world powers. István Szilágyi 
(2018) presents a broad overview of the theory of geopolitics and provides an 
extensive bibliography. He points out that the importance of production, trade 
and access to the seas were already mentioned by Friedrich Ratzel (1897) in the 
second half of the 19th century. Ratzel wrote of five great powers: England, Russia, 
1  China has been the source of many innovations, such as papermaking, printing, gunpowder and the compass, 
to mention the most well-known ones.
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China, United States and Brazil and expressed the idea of a European community 
defending the two wing forces (United States and Russia). Szilágyi also mentions 
that Rudolf Johan Kjellén (1917) made a distinction between hegemons with world 
power and those with continental influence, with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
belonging to the latter group in his opinion.
George Modelski (1988) developed a long-cycle theory which attempts to capture 
elements of regularity in the operation of world powers. He sees a connection 
between war cycles, economic supremacy and world leadership. He suggests five 
cycles since 1500, each corresponding to the existence of a hegemonic power: 
Portugal in the 16th century, the Netherlands in the 17th century, Great Britain 
in the 18th and 19th century and the United States in the 20th century. William 
Thompson (1988) and Paul Kennedy (1988) also focus on major wars and economic 
power in the rise and decline of global leadership.
Zbigniew Brzezinski (2012) already talks about the waning of America’s global 
appeal and the decline of its international influence. He writes that “if America 
falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor, 
such as China” (p.75). Rather, “in the absence of a recognized leader, the resulting 
uncertainty is likely to increase tensions among competitors and inspire self-serving 
behavior” (p.76). Behind these arguments is the author’s conviction that America 
must remain strong to preserve world order. A similar concern surfaces in the 
thoughts of Robert Kagan (2012). His greatest concern is “not really whether the 
United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the 
Americans are capable of solving any of their most pressing economic and social 
problems” (p.130). This is a relevant point, since many empires dissolved as a result 
if internal strife which made them weaker and the target of external interference. 
Henry Kissinger (1979) considers the United States as the guarantor of world peace 
and together with President Richard Nixon recognised early that America had to 
establish diplomatic ties with China, a potential challenger of US influence in East 
Asia, but also a potential partner in opposing the territorial ambitions of the Soviet 
Union.
George Friedman (2012) argues that the United States did not intend to be an 
empire: its world dominance was a consequence of events, few of which were 
under the control of America (p. 14). This bears little relation to reality. To become 
a superpower, a country must possess some objective geographical conditions, and 
if it has the good fortune to have them as America does, it is the ambition of its 
people and their leaders who will make their country a hegemon. Kagan (2012, pp. 
10–11) is right that the attitude of the United States does not fit the perception of 
the “reluctant sheriff” which only goes to war because it has to. It did go to war to 
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defend itself from distant threats and to preserve its economic interests in Cuba 
against the Spanish, in Indochina against the communists and in the Middle East.
The purpose of this paper is to look at the major requirements for a country to reach 
world power status in the current globalised world and to discuss which countries 
meet the conditions to have a credible chance of becoming a dominant player in 
the emerging new world order.
2. Requirements for becoming a world power
Size matters. A large, robust economy standing on firm footing is a sine qua non 
for having a claim to becoming one of the world leaders. GDP is the main indicator 
with which we measure the size of an economy. GDP depends on the number of 
workers in a country, and so the size of the population matters. GDP also depends 
on the productivity of workers, which in turn is determined by the technology 
used. Countries which are world leaders in innovation and use state-of-the-art 
technologies are best at boosting productivity and maintaining a competitive edge 
over others in the goods and services markets. Innovation is based on know-how 
that one gains through education. A system of education which is good at training 
people who can best perform the jobs of the future from the lowest skilled ones to 
the highest skilled levels is a must for a country vying for world leadership.
Hegemons exercise their influence through trade. Diversified, competitive exports 
resting on a structure of production of goods and services needed and imported 
by other countries gives clout to the exporting country. Possessing vast and varied 
natural resources is also an asset, as it reduces reliance on others for raw materials, 
and the latter can be also valuable export commodities. The larger the territory of 
a country, more likely it is that it will possess natural resources. Furthermore, the 
size of the territory of a country also matters from the perspective of being able to 
accommodate large populations.
Other attributes matter as well. In the current globalised world, a country whose 
currency is widely used as a means of international payments renders substantial 
benefits to its issuer, an “exorbitant privilege” as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing referred 
to these benefits when he was France’s minister of finance. Barry Eichengreen 
(2011) gives an excellent description of the rise of the US dollar to international 
prominence in trade and debt financing and as a global reserve currency. He also 
discusses the benefits that this dominance provides to the United States in the 
form of seigniorage, low interest rates and the capacity to finance large budget 
and current account deficits. In fact, increasing international financial integration 
has increased the systems’ reliance on the US dollar. This reliance has provided 
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the US with the ability to use the global financial system to serve its own security 
goals (Leonard et al. 2019). One example of this ability are the sanctions imposed 
by the US against Iran.
There are indispensable conditions for a national currency to become a dominant 
player. First, a large enough quantity must be available to lubricate international 
transactions, and the markets must have confidence in the stability of the currency. 
Only large, strong economies can fulfil these conditions. Second, the currency 
must be freely convertible, the debt instruments labelled in that currency must be 
liquid, and the capital market must be transparent and backed by solid financial and 
legal systems. The political stability of the issuer country also matters as political 
instability undermines confidence in the currency. Generally, a country that wants to 
be a dominant power on the world scene will want to gain international prominence 
for its currency.
Last but not least, there are two other requirements for a country to reach world 
power statute: military might and the ambition to be a world player. The two 
generally go hand in hand, as ambition feeds decisions to devote substantial 
resources to defence spending and military strength raises the level of ambition. 
Access to the seas is important from both the military and international trade 
perspective. Throughout history, empires enjoyed sea access either by their original 
geographic location or by conquest such the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, with 
the territory of the latter also boosted by marriage contracts.
To sum up, in the current globalised world the requirements for a country to play 
a dominant role in shaping the new world order are a large population and vast 
geographic territory, access to the seas, a strong economy measured by the size of 
its GDP, leadership in innovation and technology, trade and currency dominance, 
military strength and willingness to become a world power. We purposefully do not 
discuss the role of the State in the economy, because the mix between private and 
state ownership cannot be directly linked to hegemony. However, there is evidence 
that heavy intervention by the State in the economy constrains competitiveness, 
but what constitutes the right degree of the role of the State from the point of view 
of achieving world power status is open to debate. We also leave aside a discussion 
of the role of the political regime as a factor. One certainly hopes that democracy 
will spread across the globe and countries striving for world power role will be 
democratic. If in recent history America’s lead has been accepted and sometimes 
even asked for in many parts of the world, it is because America has been looked 
upon as a freedom-loving democratic country governed by the rule of law. Yet again, 
there is no universal direct link between the political regime and world power, as 
we have also seen dictatorships and autocratic regimes attempting to shape the 
international order.
117
Geopolitical Shifts in the Evolving New World Order
3. The qualifiers
Table 1 ranks countries by population. China with 1.4 billion and India with 1.3 
billion inhabitants are the world’s most populous countries based on 2017 data. 
The US comes in third with 325 million people. Indonesia with 261 million, Brazil 
with 207 million, Pakistan with 197 million and Nigeria with 189 million inhabitants 
are the next four most populous countries. The European Union, although it is 
not a single country but comprises 28 countries forming a unified market, has 
a combined population of about 500 million and the 19 countries of the euro area 
cover a population of approximately 340 million.
Table 1
Most populous countries, 2017–2019
(million people)
Country 2017 2018 2019
China 1,390.1 1,395.4 1,400.2
India 1,316.9 1,334.2 1,351.8
European Union (EU–28) 502.5 502.9 503.4
United Kingdom 66.0 66.5 66.9
Visegrad Countries 63.8 63.8 63.8
Eurozone (EA–19) 338.5 338.5 338.5
Germany 82.7 82.9 83.0
France 64.6 64.7 65.0
Italy 60.6 60.5 60.7
United States 325.3 327.4 329.6
Indonesia 261.4 264.2 267.0
Brazil 206.8 208.3 209.8
Pakistan 197.3 201.0 204.7
Nigeria 188.7 193.9 199.2
Bangladesh 163.2 164.9 166.6
Russia 144.0 144.0 143.9
Japan 126.7 126.5 126.2
Note: Forecast from 2018.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2019
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Russia ranks first in terms of the size of its territory, followed by Canada, China and 
the United States (Table 2). India, the second most populous country, only ranks 
eight in terms of the size of its territory. Canada, Brazil and Australia occupy large 
land areas, but have relatively small populations. The EU–28 have a combined land 
area of circa 4.4 million square kilometres, larger than that of India.
Table 2
The 10 largest countries
(Thousand square kilometres)
Country Area
Russia 17,098
Canada 9,985
China 9,707
United States 9,373
Brazil 8,516
Australia 7,692
European Union (EU–28) 4,388
India 3,288
Argentina 2,780
Eurozone (EA–19) 2,762
Source: https://www.worldometers.info/geography/largest-countries-in-the-world/
From these two data sets, the clear frontrunner to challenge the hegemony of the 
United States would be China, with Russia and the EU as possible candidates, but 
let us look at the other requirements before drawing any conclusions.
There are several ways of measuring the economic strength of a country: the size 
of its GDP relative to world GDP, its per capita GDP and its importance in world 
trade. Between 2001 and 2018, the United States’ share in global GDP fell from 31.5 
per cent to 24.2 per cent. Among the challenger countries, China’s performance 
is spectacular. In 2001, its share of world GDP was 4 per cent, increasing almost 
fourfold to almost 15.8 per cent by 2018 and fast approaching that of the United 
States (Table 3). Real GDP per capita on the basis of purchasing power parity was 
forty times higher in the Unites States than in China in 1980, but by 2018, it was 
only 3.5 times higher (Table 4). This is still a large gap, but the improvement in 
living standards has been enormous in China in recent decades. It is worth noting 
that the fastest period of the catching up in per capita GDP of China started in the 
early 1990s, i.e., only about 25 year ago, making this rapid convergence even more 
remarkable. While the share in world GDP of other potential challengers has also 
increased, their advances have been far smaller than of China. The performance 
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of the Visegrad 4 (V4) countries2 is also remarkable. Although their share in global 
GDP is small, it increased by about 30 per cent to 1.3 per cent between 2001 and 
2018, largely due to the strong performance of Poland, the largest country in this 
group, and Hungary.
Table 3
Share in world GDP, 2001–2018
(in per cent, based on current US dollar prices)
Countries 2001 2010 2018
United States 31.5 22.7 24.2
European Union (EU–28) 26.8 25.8 22.1
United Kingdom 4.8 3.7 3.3
Visegrad Countries 1.0 1.4 1.3
Eurozone (EA–19) 19.6 19.2 16.1
Germany 5.8 5.2 4.7
France 4.1 4.0 3.3
Italy 3.5 3.2 2.4
China 4.0 9.2 15.8
Japan 12.8 8.6 5.9
India 1.5 2.6 3.2
Brazil 1.7 3.3 2.2
Source: Calculation based on IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2019
Table 4
Ratios of real GDP per capita in PPP terms compared to the United States,  
1980–2018
Countries 1980 1990 2001 2018
China 40.38 24.25 11.52 3.46
India 22.46 20.40 17.36 7.95
Russia n. a. 1.77 3.08 2.14
Brazil 2.56 3.43 3.98 3.88
Japan 1.40 1.20 1.34 1.42
EU–28 1.37 1.42 1.46 1.45
V4 n. a. 2.95 2.74 1.89
Note: 1995 is the first available data for V4.
Source: Calculation based on IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2019
2  V4 countries: Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia.
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Figure 1 shows the estimated contribution to global GDP growth in 2018. China 
is the leader with 27.5 per cent, followed by the United States (20.4 per cent), 
the European Union (15.5 per cent) and India (7.6 per cent). It is worth noting 
that, within the European Union, the contribution to global GDP growth of the V4 
countries amounts to 2.1 per cent, more than that of Russia (1.6 per cent) or Brazil 
(1 per cent).
These various GDP figures of the major countries are an indication of their potential 
influence on the world economy that may possibly encourage these countries’ 
ambition to play a significant role in building a new world order.
A country’s share in international trade is another benchmark indicator for its 
influence in the world economy. The US share in world exports declined from 11.9 
per cent to 8.7 per cent between 2001 and 2018, while that of China rose from 4.3 
per cent to 13 per cent during the same period (Table 5). As for imports, during the 
same period, the share of the United States declined from 18.1 per cent to 13.3 
per cent, while that of China rose from 3.9 per cent to 10.9 per cent (Table 6). The 
United States’ share in imports is still somewhat higher than China’s share, but with 
regard to exports China has overtaken the United States. The share of the EU–28, 
Figure 1
Contribution to real global GDP growth, 2018
China, 27.5% Other, 22.2%
BRA.,
1.0%
Japan,
2.0%
RU.,
1.6%
Indon.,
2.3%
V4,
2.1%
India, 7.6%
EU–28., 15.5%US., 20.4%
Notes: V4: Visegrad Countries: Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Indon.: Indonesia, RU: Russia, BRA: 
Brazil.
Source: World Bank
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at about 13 per cent, remained essentially unchanged in the field of exports and 
declined somewhat in imports, falling from 14.7 per cent to slightly more than 13 
per cent. By contrast, the share of V4 countries rose both in exports and imports, 
a significant trend that underscores the competitiveness gains in these countries.
Table 5
Share in world exports, 2001–2018
(in per cent)
Countries 2001 2010 2018
China 4.3 10.5 13.0
European Union (EU–28) 13.0 12.0 12.8
Visegrad Countries 1.6 2.5 3.0
United States 11.9 8.5 8.7
Japan 6.6 5.1 3.8
Russia 1.6 2.6 2.3
India 0.7 1.5 1.7
Brazil 1.0 1.3 1.2
Source: International Trade Center
Table 6
Share in world imports, 2001–2018
(in per cent)
Countries 2001 2010 2018
United States 18.1 12.8 13.3
European Union (EU–28) 14.7 14.3 13.3
Visegrad Countries 1.9 2.6 2.9
China 3.9 9.1 10.9
Japan 5.5 4.5 3.8
India 0.8 2.3 2.6
Russia 0.7 1.5 1.2
Brazil 0.9 1.2 0.9
Source: International Trade Center
Another way of evaluating the relative economic strength of a country is to look at 
the number of the world’s largest companies owned and operated by it (Table 7). 
Among the top Fortune 500 companies, 126 are American and 111 are Chinese. 
In the four EU countries which make it into the top ten (Germany, France, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands), there are in total 94 top 500 companies. Here again China 
stands out as the major challenger to the US, while Europe is falling behind.
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Table 7
TOP 500 companies by countries, 2018
Countries Number of companies Total Revenues 
(million USD)
USA 126 8,881,646
China 111 6,765,498
Japan 52 2,900,464
Germany 32 2,019,931
France 28 1,675,121
Great Britain 20 1,133,731
South Korea 16 844,899
Netherlands 14 960,460
Switzerland 14 756,021
Canada 12 425,169
Source: Fortune 500 Companies
As mentioned earlier, widespread use of a country’s currency in international 
financial transactions gives the issuer country clout and influence in international 
relations. Figure 2 and 3 show that the US dollar currently dominates the 
composition of foreign exchange reserves (62 per cent), the international debt 
market (62 per cent), loan transactions (56 per cent) and foreign exchange turnover 
(42 per cent). The euro comes in a distant second, except in trade invoicing where its 
share, at 40 per cent, is the same as that of the US dollar. The goal of the European 
Commission is to expand the international role of the euro in order to increase 
the financial autonomy of the monetary union. Currently, via swaps the US dollar 
serves as the backstop for international banks and the US is the largest supplier of 
safe assets in the form of US treasury bills and bonds.3 In order for the euro to play 
a stronger role in international transactions, the Banking Union would have to be 
completed, measures aimed at creating a true capital market union would have to 
be introduced, the ECB would have to accept providing large euro swaps if needed 
and a European safe asset would have to be created. All of this is easier said than 
done in the EU context, because it requires a commitment to higher cooperation 
at the political level – for instance, risk sharing – than is currently contemplated. 
For the euro to play the same role as the US dollar in the international monetary 
system, the EU also needs to forge a common foreign policy in matters of global 
significance, since divergence will weaken confidence in the currency.
3  Leonard et al. (2019)
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The Chinese renminbi currently has an insignificant weight in international financial 
transactions. However, China’s plan is to progressively increase the international 
role of its currency by allowing the issuance of renminbi bonds both offshore and 
onshore (Panda bonds). In 2016, the renminbi was included in the SDR basket with 
a weight of 10.92 per cent. China foresees a more prominent international role for 
its currency, but that would require capital market liberalisation and implementing 
a more transparent system of financial regulation and exchange rate policy. China is 
cautiously moving in that direction, and hence it can be expected that the renminbi 
will play an increasingly important role on the international scene, but it is a long 
way ahead before the renminbi will be able to challenge the US dollar or the euro 
as a global currency.
Figure 2
Importance of different currencies in the international monetary system, 2017Q4
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Finally, let us look at defence expenditures. Although the amount of military 
spending does tell a story about the military strength of a country, it is only an 
imperfect indicator of true military might. Salaries in the military and the cost 
of production of the same weaponry can vary greatly from country to country. 
The true military strength is defined by the type of weaponry and their available 
numbers, most typically whether a country has nuclear capabilities, a large naval 
force, military bases around the world, etc. Moreover, given the secrecy generally 
surrounding military spending, the available numbers might not always show the 
true extent of defence expenditure. With these reservations in mind, the amount 
of money spent year after year on the military nevertheless provides a good 
impression of the ambitions harboured by a country.
As Table 8 shows, the United States spends by far the most on defence in dollar 
terms, (USD 706 billion, representing 3.4 per cent of its GDP in 2018), followed 
by the EU–28 (USD 263 billion, or 1.4 per cent of GDP), China (estimated at USD 
250 billion, or 1.9 per cent of GDP), India (USD 66 billion, or 2.4 per cent of GDP) 
and Russia (estimated at USD 61 billion, or 3.8 per cent of GDP). Except for China, 
defence expenditures declined in all countries under consideration between 2011 
and 2017 and only increased in a few in 2018. In China, the military spending 
rose by over 80 per cent from 2011 to 2018. China is expanding its naval forces 
and has started to build up naval bases. Among the countries under review, the 
United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China and India possess nuclear 
weapons (outside this group of countries, Israel and Pakistan also have nuclear 
weapons).
Figure 3
Official foreign exchange reserves by currency, 2018 Q4
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Table 8
Defence expenditures, 2011–2018
(million USD)
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
United States 740,744 712,947 680,856 653,942 641,253 656,059 685,957 706,063
European Union (EU–28) 260,639 242,432 247,420 249,073 217,216 219,077 230,641 262,991
United Kingdom 62,852 58,016 62,258 65,658 59,492 56,964 55,344 61,508
France 53,441 50,245 52,316 51,940 43,474 44,191 46,036 52,025
Germany 48,140 46,470 45,931 46,102 39,813 41,590 45,580 51,009
Italy 30,223 26,468 26,658 24,448 19,566 22,373 23,852 25,780
China 137,967 157,390 179,880 200,772 214,093 216,031 227,829 249,997
Russia 70,238 81,469 88,353 84,697 66,419 69,245 66,527 61,388
Japan 60,762 60,012 49,024 46,881 42,106 46,471 45,387 46,618
India 49,634 47,217 47,404 50,914 51,295 56,638 64,559 66,510
Brazil 36,936 33,987 32,875 32,660 24,618 24,225 29,283 27,766
Notes: Data for China are estimates for the entire period and data for Russia are estimates for 2011 and 
2012 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Data for the other countries are 
from NATO. 2018 data are estimates.
4. Toward a multipolar world order
History has taught us that hegemons tend to emerge time and time again, but 
they end up being challenged. The decline of a dominant world power and the 
emergence of a new hegemon has taken generally a long time, often lasting 
centuries. In today’s world of rapid technological changes and increasing global 
competition, the geopolitical shifts will be significantly faster than in previous 
centuries.
Looking at today’s developments, it seems obvious that the relative power of the 
United States to shape and direct global events is diminishing. The ‘Pax Americana’ 
as we have known it since the Second World War is coming to an end. That does 
not mean by any means that America will not remain a world leader for decades 
to come. America has a strong economy based on its leading role in innovation and 
technology and its capacity to attract talent from all over the world. It possesses 
vast natural resources and has a determining position in international trade, while 
the dominance of the US dollar in the international monetary system provides it 
with benefits that no other country currently enjoys. The country lies between two 
oceans and has the means and will to remain the strongest military power. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski adds another dimension to America’ strength which he calls “reactive 
mobilization”, defined as social mobilisation in the face of danger that prompts 
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national unity.4 Brzezinski cites the “Remember Pearl Harbor” as a slogan that 
mobilised the country’s war effort. A more recent example of this national unity is 
9/11, when tens of millions of cars flew a flag, so much so that even a Hungarian 
company received orders to supply American flags.
America feels that it is destined to lead the world. American exceptionalism 
is ingrained in the leaders of the United States and is shared by many in the 
population. It is rooted in its history of fighting for freedom, democracy and 
equality. It can be best captured by the famous Gettysburg speech of Abraham 
Lincoln when he proclaimed the “government of the people, by the people, for 
the people” and it is enshrined in the Bill of Rights. As Robert Kagan writes,5 even 
today “presidents and politicians speak of the ‘leader of the free world’ (Barack 
Obama), the ‘indispensable nation’ (Madelaine Albright) upon which the ‘world 
is counting’ for ‘global leadership’ (Hillary Clinton)”. However, the “America First” 
slogan of Donald Trump suggests that America is becoming increasingly reluctant 
to assume the responsibility of global leadership, even as it is prepared to wield its 
economic and military power to pursue its own economic interests and security 
goals. Good examples of the US using its economic power in defence of its perceived 
interests are the trade war with China, the threat of imposing tariff on imports from 
the EU to the United States and, as a way of dividing the unity of Europe, the US 
endorsement of Brexit, coupled with the offer to the UK a fast track to conclude 
a free trade agreement.
The picture unfolding from the data and the discussion presented in this paper is 
that China is the best placed to challenge the economic dominance of the United 
States. Its large population, vast territory, rapid economic growth, strength in 
innovation and technological developments, and its leading role in international 
trade all predestine China to be a world leader. Its ambition to be part of shaping 
the new world order is also clear. While the dominance of the United States in 
international organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the UN is still 
prevalent, China is member of over 300 international and regional organisations 
and its weight in these organisations is on the rise. The Belt and Road and 17+16 
initiatives and the Chinese investments in the United States, Europe, Asia, Africa 
and South America reveal a strategy on the part of China of expanding its economic 
ties well beyond the confines of its national borders and reaching out across the 
globe. A true leader of the world needs a strong army to back up its aspirations 
and China is building up its military strength even as it stresses that it is for defence 
purposes and we have no proof to believe otherwise. A challenge that China is 
facing is the aging of its population as a result of the decades long “one-child only” 
4  Brzezinski (2012), p. 60.
5  Kagan (2012), p. 14.
6  The 17+1 cooperation is an initiative by China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with Central 
and Eastern European countries. It comprises 12 EU Member States and 5 Balkan countries.
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policy. That policy was changed recently, but it will take many years before this aging 
can be halted. China has the room and ability to raise productivity that can offset 
the shrinking of the labour force, but aging is a factor which will be a constraint 
on growth. This, however, will not prevent China from becoming a world power.
Russia could be another challenger and it certainly wants to play a role in shaping 
the emerging new order. It has the military might, but its economy is on a relatively 
weak footing for the time being, relying heavily on the oil and gas industry. That 
will certainly change over time so that Russia is among the powers that will play 
a defining role in the new multipolar world order.
The European Union has the size, the economic and innovative strength and 
the military power to be an important player in world affairs, but the fact that it 
does not have a common foreign policy and a unified view on such questions as 
a common defence policy and the macroeconomic role of an EU-wide budget limits 
its influence. Unfortunately, Brexit drives a wedge between the United Kingdom 
and the EU, fragmenting European unity. Henry Kissinger has a grim view of Europe 
when it says that there is “a continuing weakening of European relevance because 
of Europe’s loss of a sense of global mission”.7 Carl Bildt, the former Prime Minister 
of Sweden, rightly suggests that the EU “should establish a political process at the 
European level that develops the ability to act independently and, at the same time, 
forges new mechanisms for encouraging unity among member states”.8 Considering 
the diverse interests of the Member States, this will require some time. However, 
Europe can usefully intermediate in helping to solve regional conflicts and can 
be an initiator of and driving force behind good causes, such as for instance the 
protection of the environment.
The future of world power politics is technology. “Data and technological 
sovereignty, not nuclear warheads, will determine the global distribution of 
power and wealth in this century” notes Joschka Fischer, former German Foreign 
Minister.9 In the realm of the platform economy, such as Microsoft, Apple, Alibaba, 
etc., artificial intelligence and Big Data, Europe is a distant third behind the US 
and China. As György Matolcsy (2019) writes, “disruptive new technologies tend 
to redistribute power, economic strength and financial resources globally….the 
European elites lost the American option for winning together in the new tides 
of disruptive technologies” (p. 32). In part this is a consequence of the lack of 
single market in research and capital finance. To meet the challenges of the future 
and maintain competitiveness, Europe needs retooling and reskilling. While all 
individual countries have a responsibility in this process, EU-level government 
support is indispensable. In the case of China, the determining role of government in 
7  Henry Kissinger, Nobel Prize Forum, Oslo, December 11, 2016.
8  Fischer (2019).
9  Bildt (2019).
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innovation is not in doubt. In the US also, the role of the government in supporting 
innovation has been essential through spending on space exploration and defence. 
The EU needs to work toward achieving digital sovereignty and this cannot be done 
without a concerted EU-level policy.
The question is how the multipolar world order will function. Will there be peace or 
war? Nuclear peace? Or regional wars where the interests of competing hegemons 
clash? Will there be well defined geographic spheres with the dominance of 
a specific world power? One could imagine a world order in which China plays 
a dominant role in Asia, the United States in Latin America, Russia in Eurasia and 
Europe in Africa. Or will the competing hegemons want to shape events across the 
globe? These are the questions to be asked and everyone can speculate about the 
outcome. One thing seems to be sure: the US hegemony over the world will fade 
as challengers gain power. The influence of China and Russia and later perhaps that 
of India in shaping the course of world events will increase. Europe will need to be 
more unified in key policy areas if it wants to defend its interests and keep its rightful 
place among the world leaders in an increasingly competitive environment. The EU 
must engage with China while upholding its traditional ties with the US. The Belt 
and Road initiative and the 17+1 cooperation must not be looked at as a divisive 
factor between the eastern and western parts of Europe – as some like to present 
it – but as an opportunity to forge closer ties with China.
All told, there is a need for strong, democratic countries which are world leaders 
to maintain peace and order in the world. To conclude with Robert Kagan’s words: 
“There can be no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms, 
uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the 
peace”.10 In the future, this will be a shared power between two or three hegemons 
and it will be their responsibility to maintain the world order Kagan is referring to.
Finally, let us recall that over the centuries, the V4 countries were often caught up in 
the rivalries among powers trying to extend their dominance in Europe. Today, they 
are members of the European Union at the east-west and north-south crossroads 
of trade routes in Europe. They are also valuable members of NATO. It is of vital 
interest for the V4 countries and the other Central and Eastern European countries 
to reflect on what geopolitical shifts one can expect in the decades ahead.
10  Kagan (2012), p. 139.
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